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לאט לראש וראשון מס לאט לאט
 מס: 341

מחלקת המס
 מנהל המס

מחלקה

5/1916 - 4/1933
 זמנית וק"י זמנית
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מס, חיק

סיוע' יוק"י
 מנהל המס
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מסמכים

2855 384/

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מסמכים

חית מס'

מדינת ישראל
מנזר המדינה

384/2855

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ארכיונים
לא רשמיים

מסמכים

מסמכים

מסמכים

حزب مصر الفتاة

وفلسطين

بيان

عن القضية الفلسطينية

١ - يعلن حزب مصر الفتاة أن تقسيم فلسطين وتأسيس دولة يهودية على حدود البلاد هو خطر على مصر أولاً وبالذات يجب أن يقاوم بكل ما في المصيرين من قوة وعزم وذلك للأسباب الآتية

٢ - من الناحية الاقتصادية يفصل مصر عن الاقطار العربية في آسيا وبحول دون التعاون والتعامل معها ويعرقل الاتصال الاقتصادي والثقافي بها ويجعل حدود مصر الشرقية يهدد أجنية غير مأونة الولاء

٣ - من الناحية الاجتماعية يخلق مشروع الوطن القومي في فلسطين خطر شديد على النشاط الاقتصادي في مصر وعلى العامل المصري إذ في إمكان المملكة اليهودية بطرق مختلفة أن تقضي على كل عمل صناعي محلي في مصر مهما شجع ودفع عنه وان تغلق أسواق الشرق في وجه المصنوعات المصرية بواسطة وكلائها التجاريين ودعاياتها القوية ومغرياتها المتنوعة وأن تفسد العامل المصري بما تفرس فيه من مبادئ هدامة

٤ - من الناحية الاجتماعية تخلق مملكة يهودية على حدود مصر وجد في مصر أقلية تنجح بميوها وأهوائها إلى غير البلد الذي تعيش فيه وتحدث له من المشاكل الداخلية ما يصرفه عن العمل المنتج وما يتخذ سبيلا للتدخل الاجنبي. واصدق مثال على ذلك مشكلة الاقليات التي تتمثل امام أعيننا في أوروبا الوسطى اليوم زد على ذلك أن اليهود يحبون في فلسطين حياة لا تلتزم مع الحق المصري والعادات المصرية ومبادئ حزب مصر الفتاة الاجتماعية واقتصادها هدم للأسرة المصرية وتأثيرها في مصر متوقع لغربها من فلسطين وسهولة المواصلات بين البلدين وعليه فحزب مصر الفتاة يرى بقاء على ما تقدم أن قضية فلسطين جزء من قضية مصر وأن عليه أن يعمل بكل قوته على مؤازرة اخوانه عرب فلسطين بكل وسيلة ممكنة وأن يبذل لهم العونة والنصر

رئيس حزب مصر الفتاة

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وقد حلت مساء امس فوق مدينة سان لويس
ن والقنصل اربع قنصل على المطار فلم يصيب احد
معتدية على غير جدوى وتعد هذه الحادثة بمثابة

ال كاماشو وزير الحرية ان جنود الاتحاد
ثوار المساجين الذين نصبوا كميناً لآلاي
وارء وقتل ثلاثة وجرح ثلاثة من الثوار في
لويس بونوزي حيث اكتشفت قبلة من
مائر وقد طردت جنود الاتحاد الثوار الذين
الامري انهم امروا بان ينسقوا الكوري
د الولايات المتحدة

صين و اليابان

يون بان معظم الجيش الصيني المدافع عن
الصفي الاكبر
على محاذات سكة الحديد لتجهاى صدها
افضت كراتهم الى استعادة لاهوانغ
يش اليا باني

الجنوبية و الشرقية

ما في مصايف انكثرا الجنوبية والشرقية في
منها ٢٨ ساعة يومي السبت والاحد . وبلغ
٣٣ سفن (في بول وسوت سي ونزل

امير كي

وندستو تسيري من اعضاء شركة مورغان
لها الارملة وابنته واحفاده وحرمانه
ال اير بسبب هباته الكثيرة في حياته

سكندرونة

كية السورية انه قد أعدت اما كن لفصائل
الحدود والحيل والسيارات والمواني
قلم السنجق وعززت الجنود القروسية في
برة وكان بين الجندات جنود ميكانيكية
الانقاذ كية دابة على

Notes Collected in several interviews with Nasib Bey al-Bakri.

The headquarters of al-Fatat were transferred to Damascus in 1913. Nasib Bey was made a member by Ahmad Qadri in 1912 or 1913.

When war broke out and Turkey had joined, Nasib's brother Fauzi was mobilised. At the request of their father, Ata Pasha, the Sharif Husain agreed to write to Enver Pasha to request, in view of the close friendship between the Sharif and the Bakri family, that any members of that family who might be mobilised should be attached to his service to help him in the efforts he was making to raise an army of volunteers.

Enver acceded to this request and ordered that Fauzi be attached to the Sharif. Nasib seized the opportunity and made Fauzi join al-Fatat. As soon as Fauzi had joined and sworn the oath, the members held a meeting at which they charged him with a mission to the Sharif. This mission was that Fauzi should explain to the Sharif the organisation and the ideals of al-Fatat, and to try and convince him that the society was in a position to effect a serious revolt in Syria. It was about that time that Ata Pasha, Sami al-Bakri, Hawwaf Sha'lan, Sultan and Nasib and Salim al-Atrash, Kuri Sha'lan were sworn in as members.

When Fauzi got to the Sharif and gave him the explanations relating to al-Fatat, the latter decided to delegate his son Faisal to Damascus or Constantinople. The ostensible object of Faisal's arrival would be to protest to the authorities about

the intrigues of the Ittehadists, but the real and secret object was to examine for himself the organisation of al-Fatat on the spot.

Faisal arrived in Damascus and met Yasin, Rikabi, Hawwaf and many other members of al-Fatat. They all pressed him to start the revolt in the Hejaz. He agreed to join the society as a member and swore the oath. Yasin said to him that the 35th Division would rise to a man on a sign from him.

Faisal went on to Constantinople and returned. The Turks gave him £ 25,000 for the army of volunteers, and of this sum Faisal secretly gave al-Fatat £ 1,000.

Then Faisal left for the Hejaz carrying with him the conditions to be agreed upon with the British.

Faisal returned to Damascus in the winter bringing with him some fifty chosen men as a vanguard of the army of volunteers. Among these were the Sharif Nasir, the Sharif Ali ibn al-Hareth, and the Sharif Ali ibn 'Uraid. The rest were tribal chiefs and personal bodyguard. Faisal professed before Jemal Pasha to have come with these men in order to discuss with him the details of an attack upon Egypt, and throughout the months which followed he displayed remarkable skill and finesse to avoid arousing Jemal's suspicions. He played so adroitly on Jemal's vanity that he succeeded, in spite of Jemal's lurking suspicions, in convincing him that he and his father were absolutely loyal. At the same time, Faisal held constant secret meetings with the members of al-Fatat in the Bakri house, at which he explained the progress of the preparations and of the negot-

lations with the British. He kept in touch with his father by means of a special cipher which was always sent by messenger (on one occasion Abdullah all but ruined the cipher and the plot by telegraphing to Faisal to say that final agreement had been reached with the British which provided for the complete independence of the Arab countries, and asking them to hurry up).

About that time the Turks in Medina were growing suspicious of Ali who had been sent there by his father to collect the tribes and make propaganda among them. The Turks decided to send a special force under the command of Fakhri Pasha ostensibly to go to the Yemen, but in reality destined to get to Mecca and watch over the Sharif. Jemal also asked Faisal to write to Ali and ask him to come to Damascus.

To this Faisal, scenting danger, pleaded with Jemal for Ali to be sent to Mecca instead of Damascus, and Jemal accepted. Faisal gave a lunch party in honour of Jemal at Qabun, and there he and Shaikh As'ad Shugairi took Jemal on one side after lunch and pleaded with him for the pardon of the Arab patriots who were undergoing their trial before the Aley Military Courts. (According to the notes made from al-Balagh, this lunch party took place in the first week of April, 1916).

Shortly afterwards, a message came to Faisal from his father telling him that everything was ready for the revolt and that he had to come to Medina at once. Faisal had to find a pretext on which to leave Damascus. He managed to persuade Jemal that it would be a very good thing if one of the sons of the Sharif were to come at the head of the army of volunteers and lead

them in person to Damascus or to Jerusalem. Jamal fell into the trap and suggested that his son should be Faisal at the head of a delegation which was eventually composed of Nasib al-Bakri, Abdul-Qader al-Khatib (preacher in the Omayyad Mosque), Wassaf Bey (Legal Adviser to the Fourth Army, a Turk) and others. The delegation started from Damascus at about the same time as Ali, at the head of a corps of volunteers, was starting from Mecca to come to Medina. Faisal and Ali met in Medina. Fakhri was already there. Again Faisal resorted to a clever ruse in order to gain time. He sent the members of the delegation back to Damascus with instructions that they should discuss with Jamal Pasha whether the volunteers were to be sent to Damascus as an army on the march, or whether they should proceed by train.

He did this in order to get rid of them and to gain time in his preparations with Ali. He said secretly to Nasib Bey that he was going to ask his father to delay the revolt a month or two, but he was not sure whether his father would consent as he understood from Ali that Hussain was ready to revolt at once. He furthermore agreed with Nasib on the texts of two telegrams. The first was: "Dispatch two cases of oranges", which meant "revolt delayed two months". The second was: "Dispatch bay horse", which meant "revolt will take place in five days".

Nasib returned to Damascus with the delegation and on the morning following his return he received the second telegram. This meant that the die was cast and that he would have to escape with his brothers before the fifth day. His first care was to get his brother Fauzi and his womenfolk to clear out, and this they did by train to Medina, and from there they made their way to Mecca. As for Nasib he informed the suite of

Faisal who were living in Qabun and they made their preparations in the greatest secrecy. On the fifth day after the receipt of the telegram (Jemal Pasha was in Jerusalem and due to return to Damascus on that day) Nasib and the suite started from Qabun at dawn, riding horses and camels, and announcing that they were going to the Bakri property at al-'Adra. They proceeded to Dumair and thence into the desert. Nasib had taken with him his brothers Sami and Mazhar. He also had with him Khaled al-Hakim (who had been sentenced to death in absence and was living in hiding) and Riad al-Muhairi (a nephew of Doctor Shahbandar). Then started their long and painful pilgrimage across the desert. The horses died of thirst. Eventually the party having lost several men on the way, reached Mskaka where they were received by Nawwaf.

Discussions began as to the next move. Nasib was in favour of making Jauf their base for a general tribal revolt in combination with the Druses for an attack on Damascus, and Nawwaf agreed. They accordingly dispatched a party of five to proceed to Faisal's camp outside Medina to inform him of the plan and ask for twenty thousand rifles. The distance to the camp was eight days each way; and yet, after waiting thirty days the party had not returned. Nasib became anxious and decided to proceed himself to Faisal's camp. He cut across to Enaibar and there heard rumours of the defeat of the Arab leaders. This rumour as it turned out was not true. They went on and eventually reached al-Athab (which lies on the Medina-Rabegh road) where Ali had his camp. There they also found Nuri al-Sa'id and another Iraqi officer called Hilmi.

After a time they proceeded with Ali to Rabegh. Subsequently Nasib went to Mecca, and then to Wajh where he joined Faisal with whom he remained until the occupation of Damascus, save for a visit of six weeks to Cairo.

In discussing the reasons which had led Husain to fall foul of the Turks, Nasib bey laid stress on this fact. It appears that about 2 years before the war, Husain was pressing the Turks to appoint him vali of the Hejaz under the supervision of Constantinople. In those days, Husain's authority was confined to Mecca and Taif, and did not include Medina. The Turks did not agree to this proposal. On the contrary they became suspicious of Husain's ambition, and this was one of the reasons which decided them on sending Wahib bey with instructions to govern in accordance with the vilayet law of administration.



³
August 15, 1935.

Shaikh Kamel al-Kassab.

Notes made at interview held in Jerusalem on August 15, 1935.

He was in Damascus in 1914, and had been for some time a member of al-Fatāt.

Before Turkey's entry into the war, letters had reached Damascus (from Rafiq al-Azm and Rashid Rida in Cairo) with information about the possibility of supplying (British) arms and ammunition, and inquiries as to the possibility of concerted action in Syria.

The members of al-Fatat deputed him to Egypt to find out true position.

He sailed on an Italian steamer for Alexandria. (He was not sure of the dates. In answer to my questions he said that he had left Damascus well after the arrival of Jemal Pasha, and that when he arrived in Egypt, Sultan Husain had been proclaimed. This dates his arrival in Egypt to January 1915 at the earliest.)

He was closely scrutinised on arrival, but eventually allowed to go to Cairo under watch; and there he got into immediate touch with Rafiq and Rashid. The latter told him about the three emissaries he had sent, in agreement with the British,

(1) to Syria -- he arrived in Beirut just as Turkey had declared war, and turned back.



(11) to Ibn Sa'ud - he was arrested in Basra by the British and interned for 6 months.

(111) to the Idrisi - he got there but does not appear to have achieved anything of immediate interest.

Nothing conclusive was achieved during his stay in Egypt. He decided to return to Syria, and managed to make his way back to Damascus on an Italian steamer by the devious route of Jaffa, Haifa, Beirut, Mersine and Adalia. It was only at this last port that he succeeded in landing.

(He does not remember the date, but he remembers that this steamer was the last Italian steamer that sailed from Egypt to Syria while Italy was still neutral. This dates his return to the month of May 1915).

On arrival in Damascus, he heard that Faisal had arrived there and gone to Constantinople; and that he had been sworn into membership of al-Fatāt.

He did not see Faisal. He was taken to Aley and underwent trial before the courtmartial, but was acquitted, having managed to give the court a convincing account of why he had gone to Egypt (debts to collect, school text-books to buy).

On his return to Damascus from Aley, he was told by fellow-members of al-Fatāt that they had agreed with Faisal about a revolt and had given him a written definition of the frontiers of the Arab countries for which they would require a promise of independence as a condition of their revolt. Weeks and months

elapsed without an answer forthcoming from Faisal. The plotters therefore decided to send Sheikh Kamel to Mecca to press matters. The pretext he took was the pilgrimage. He went by train to Medina, then rode to Mecca arriving there about the first of Zul Hejja. (This dates his arrival in Mecca to about October 9, 1915).

When he got to Mecca, all the Sharif's sons were there, with the exception of Abdallah. Ali had not yet gone to Madina or Faisal returned to Damascus.

Shortly after his arrival in Mecca, the Sharif received the conclusive letter from the High Commissioner in Egypt.

(N.B. This undoubtedly refers to Sir Henry MacMahon's letter of October 24, 1915. -- G.A.)

The Sharif told him about it in great secrecy.

He was in Mecca for months, until after the outbreak of the Revolt, and was a witness of the telegrams sent by the Sharif to Grand Vizier, Khairi Effendi, Enver and Jemal, pleading for the mercy with the Arab patriots.

كيف اتصل الملك فيصل بالقضية العربية

وكيف اعدت الممرات لاضرام الثورة العربية

بقلم السياسي العربي النبيل الدكتور احمد قدري وهو قطب من اقطاب الحركة العربية ابان نشأتها ولا يزال الخالص المتفاني الذي لم تغيره السنون كما غيرت سواه ولم تفتته الاوضاع كما فتنت غيره.

اتصلت بهم الجمعية بواسطة ضابط عربي اسمه عبد المجيد بك كان في هيئة اركان حرب السيد الهاشمي ، وكان متصلا بالمرحوم عبد القوي العربي وبهذه الوسطة نشأت الصلة بين الجمعية والهاشمي باشا .

الاتصال بجلالة


الملك فيصل

وجاء دمشق في تلك الاثناء سمو الامير فيصل فانصلت الجمعية به وانشأت صلات وثيقة معه ودعته الى قيادة الحركة وتولي زعامتها . وكانت خطة الجمعية يومئذ تقوم على اعلان الثورة في بلاد الحجاز وفي سوريا في زمن واحد والمناداة باستقلال بلاد العرب وتحريرها .

حالة الحجاز

والواقع ان حالة الحجاز ووضع الجغرافي والاقتصادي والزراعي كانت تستلزم القيام بعمل حاسم لا تقاذه من خطر المجاعة وقد تمشت بين ابناؤه في السنة الثانية لاعلان الحرب . ولا يخفى ان اراضي الحجاز غير منبتة وان اهل الحجاز يستوردون ذخيرتهم وطعامهم بالبواخر والسفن الشراعية فلما ضرب الحلفاء الحصار على شواطئ البحر الاحمر العثمانية ومنعوا كل اتصال بها ، انقطع الوارد من الذخيرة فنفذ المدخر تدريجياً وأخذت الضائقة تشتد فلم تبق ولم تذر ومات كثيرون جوعاً .

والحجاز من الاقطار غير المنتجة



(الدكتور احمد قدري)

ما كادت الحرب العظمى تعلن في سنة ١٩١٤ وتنصرف الدولة العثمانية الى التاهب والاستعداد لها حتى اجتمعت الهيئة الادارية لجمعية الفتاة في دمشق لدرس الموقف والاتفاق على خطة سير عليها فاصدرت باتفاق الآراء القرار الآتي :-

« لما كانت البلاد العربية الداخلة في المملكة العثمانية مستهدفة لاشد الاخطار بسبب اشتراك الدولة في الحرب فيجب العمل لا تقاذه وتحريرها . على ان تنضم الجمعية الى جانب الدولة اذا كان هنالك خطر استعماري وتقاوم كل احتلال اجنبي مهما كان شكله ونوعه »

الاتصال بالجيش

ولم يكن للجمعية كبير صلة بضباط الجيش من ابناؤه العرب قبل الحرب بل كانوا اعضاء في جمعية العهد وقد

ويعول في موارد على مايربحه من
الحجاج ، وقد انقطع ورود هؤلاء أيضاً
بسبب الحصار المضروب . فسارت
الضائقة الاقتصادية الشديدة الى جانب
المجاعة فتخرج الموقف ويلات العمل
لا تقاذ البلاد واخراجها من ضيقها من
اضر الضروريات وواجب الواجبات .
وما كان مستطاعا الحصول على مواد
الغذاء بواسطة سكة حديد دمشق المدينة
من الوجهة العملية للأسباب الآتية :—
١ — لان محصولات سوريا ابان
الحرب ماكانت تكفيها يدل على ذلك
انتشار المجاعة في بعض انحاءها منذ السنة
الثانية للحرب .

٢ — ارتفاع اسعار الحبوب
والقوت في سوريا ارتفاعاً زائداً .
٣ — عدم وجود الوقود الكافي
لتسيير القطارات .

حالة سورية

وما كانت الحالة العامة في سورية
تفضل حالة الحجاز كثيراً فقد انتشرت
المجاعة في بعض اجزائها ونفشت الامراض
والاوبئة بين ابناءها ، واشتد الضغط على
سكانها ، يضاف الى هذا اضطراب
الحالة الاقتصادية وتدنيتها تدريجاً وما
شاع يومئذ من ازماع الحلفاء على احتلال
اسكندرونه لفصل بلاد العرب عن
بلاد الترك وما يعرفه رجال الجمعية من
مطامع استعمارية لبعض الدول في سورية
ابان وجودهم بالغرب . ولذلك كان
لابد من القيام بعمل حاسم لا تقاؤها
من ورطتها بالتعاون مع الحجاز لتحقيق
الاستقلال التام .

مفاوضات الحلفاء

ورأى المغفور له الملك حسين ما يكابه

الحجاز من ضيق وعناء وادرك ان
الحالة تسوء يوماً فوما وان الخطب قد
يستفحل اذا لم يبادر الى معالجته بالمعالجات
الواقية ، وبناء على هذه الاعتبارات

الوجيهة وافق على الدخول بمفاوضات
مع الحلفاء على قاعدة الاستقلال التام
لبلاذ العرب . ولا بد لي من القول ان
خطته هذه لقيت معارضة من بعض
انجاله الامراء في اول الامر لما يجره
التشتت والانقسام من عواقب وبيلة
اولا ، ولان معدات العمل لم تكن قد
اعدت كما يجب ثانياً . وكان الامير
فيصل من هذا الفريق ومن القائلين
بالاحتفاظ بوجد الترك وعدم الدخول في
حرب ضدهم اذا لم تكن مأمونة النتائج .

الامير في دمشق

اتصلت الجمعية بالامير على اثر
وصوله دمشق كما مر آنفاً . وبسطت
على مسامعه حالة البلاد ودعته الى العمل
لا تقاؤها من ضيقها وتحريرها من الضغط
الشديد الباسط ظله عليها . وكان في
عداد الذين اجتمعوا به ودعوه الى العمل
الشيخ بدر الدين الحسيني عالم الشام ،
فقال له ان السمكوت بعد ان وصلت
الحالة الى ما وصلت اليه من الظلم والارهاق
لا يجوز نم سلمه ختمه الخاص ليسلمه الى
والده دلالة موافقته التامة وتأنيده
ما يأتني به .

وكذلك اجتمع به رضا باشا الركابي
وتكلم بضرورة العمل . واجتمع جلانته
بالسيد الهاشمي رئيس اركان
حرب فيلق الموصل يومئذ وقد قل هذا

الفيلق الى سوريا في ابان الحرب العظمى
وكنا نسميه (جيش الخلاص) وكانت
آمالنا معلقة عليه للبدء بالحركات
العسكرية اذ كان القوة العسكرية الوحيدة
في سورية .

ما ن اقال السيد الهاشمي

سأل الامير عما يحتاجون
اليه من قوات لاضرام الثورة في سورية
فاجابه اننا لا نحتاج الى شيء مطلقاً لدينا
هنا المعدات الكافية وانما يجب ان تبدأوا

انتم هنالك لتبدأ نحن هنا ونسير متعقبين .

القرار النهائي

فازاء هذا الاجماع الذي يشترك فيه رجال العرب من شيوخهم الى ضباطهم وشبانهم قرر الامير العمل ونم الاتفاق على ان يذهب الى الحجاز ويعود على رأس جيش من المتطوعة تحت ستار الاشتراك في الحملة الزاحفة على القتال وبعد ان يصل الى سوريا تعلن الثورة بقيادته ويشترك فيها جيش الخلاص

السفر الى الحجاز

ولتنفيذ هذه الخطة والاتفاق مع جلالة الحسين عليها غادر الامير دمشق قاصداً الحجاز غير انه ما كاد يستقر في المدينة حتي بدأت الثورة العربية الكبرى فغال اعلانها دون رجوع سموه الى سوريا وتنفيذ الخطة التي اتفق عليها . فتفرد بالعمل في الحجاز باديء ذي بدء ثم انتقل الى سوريا كما هو معروف . وفي مقدمة الاسباب التي عجّلت في اضرام الثورة هي :

١ - اعدام القافلة الثانية من الشهداء في بيروت ودمشق يوم ٦ مايو سنة ١٩١٦ فقد بذلت مساعي عظيمة عند احمد جمال باشا وكان سمو الامير فيصل نفسه في مقدمة العاملين لحمله على تعديل هذه الخطة فلم يقبل بل اعدمهم واصر على تنفيذ سياسته الظالمة

٢ - نفيه العائلات والاسر السورية الكبيرة الى اقاصي الاناضول والعمل لتربكها وانزال مهاجري الارمن في ديارها .

٣ - تشتيت شمل ضباط العرب

الذين كانوا في سوريا خلال السنة الاولى للحرب وابعادهم الى ميادين القتال المختلفة . فقد ارسلوا الهاشمي الى غاليسيا وارسلوا غيره الى روسيا والدردينيل . ولم يبقوا من المتصلين بالحركة احد .

٤ - سعي جمعية الاتحاد والترقي للقضاء على العنصر الراقي المتعلم من شباب العرب .

٥ - سيرها على سياسة الضغط والارهاب .

"Jawid al-Islamiya"
4th April, 1933.

صفحة خطيرة من تاريخ الثورة العربية

آل البكري الذين كانوا في نفس الوقت ضباطاً في الجيش التركي .
وعلم شريف مكة الحسين بن علي من « فوزي البكري » أحد ضباط القوى التركية في مكة ، بخبر تلك الجمعية فارسل ولده الأمير فيصل بمهمة الى استانبول واوصاه بالمرور على الشام والتعرف الى رجال تلك الجمعية . فاسافر فيصل الى استانبول وعرج الى طريقه على دمشق ونزل ضيفاً على آل البكري وهناك تعرف على زعماء الحركة العربية وعلى اغراض ومرامي تلك الجمعية ، ثم تابع سفره الى استانبول لتتبع المهمة الظاهرية التي قدم لاجلها وعرض على الباب العالي خضوع والده وولاه عرب الحجاز للخليفة العثماني . ثم عاد الى مكة ففعل لوالده خبر تلك الجلسة التاريخية التي حضرها في بيت البكري والتي تحقق فيها من استعداد عرب سوريا للثورة وخلع النير التركي عن كواهلهم . وفي تلك الاثناء دخلت تركيا الحرب العظمى وحشدت حملة كبيرة سيرتها الى قتال السويس . واراد السلطان التركي ان يختبر مدي خضوع شريف مكة له فاعز لجمال باشا القائد التركي في سوريا بان يطلب من شريف مكة يد المعونة لتركيا في الميدان الجنوبي . فكتب جمال باشا الى الحسين يطلب منه ان يمد الحملة الزاحفة على القتال بجيش من متطوعة العرب . فرد عليه الشريف يظهر استعداداته التام لتعزيد جيش الخليفة من محاربة « الكفرة » ولسلطان ينقصه السلاح والذخيرة لرجاله . وقد احدث هذا الرد الودي ضجة استحسان كبرى لدى السلطات التركية وصدرت الاوامر في الحال بارسال كمية كبيرة من السلاح الى الحجاز ، وارسل

نشرت جريدة ها آرتس ، بمناسبة يوم ذكرى الثورة العربية ، فصلاً كبيراً عن تاريخ تلك الثورة بقلم الخواجه ر . موصيري محرر القسم الشرقي في الجريدة المذكورة ، ذكر انه استقى المعلومات التي دونها في ذلك الفصل من حديث خاص لنسيب بك البكري احد رجال تلك الثورة ، حينما كان مفضوياً عليه من السلطة الافرنسية ، ورضيت السلطات الفلسطينية بسكناه « يافا » سنة ١٩٢٧ .
قال الكاتب ، بعد مقدمة قصيرة ذكر فيها تاريخ آل البكري في دمشق ونوه بمجهودهم التي بذلوها في الحركة الثورية العربية مايلي :
« لما اعلن دستور سنة ١٩٠٨ في تركيا تنفست السلطة العثمانية الصعداء من ظلم عبد الحميد واستبشرت البلاد خيراً بهذا الدستور الجديد . ولم يلبث رجال « حزب الاتحاد والترقي » ان قاموا بالدعاية الواسعة لتوحيد الشعور الوطني العثماني بين جميع الشعوب التي يفرق عليها علم السلطنة ، فقد كان من رأيهم ان « تبريك » تلك الشعوب هي احسن وسيلة وخير ضمان لحفظ كيان تلك السلطنة الواسعة المترامية الاطراف . ورأى الشباب العرب في هذه الخطوة التركية الجديدة من جماعة حزب الاتحاد والترقي احتقاراً للبلاد العربية وتضييعاً للقومية العربية فنهضوا يقاومون تلك الحركة واخذت جميعاتهم السرية التي تأسست لهذه الغاية تعمل على ايقاظ الشعور القومي في البلاد العربية . وكان من اقوى تلك الجمعيات في ذلك الحين جمعية « حزب الفتاة » (كذا) يرز من بين رجالها بعض افراد من

السلطان مبلغ ٢٠ ألف ليرة تركية ذهباً
الى شريف مكة لصرفها على متطوعة
العرب .

ومن ذلك اليوم شرع الحسين
بتجنيد المتطوعة وحشد الفرسان ، وفي
نفس الوقت كانت المفاوضات دائرية بينه
وبين رسل الحكومة الانكليزية
للاتقاض على الباب العالي . واقضت
مدة انتظار فيها جمال باشا بفارغ الصبر
التحاق فرق متطوعة العرب بالحلة التركية
في الميدان الجنوبي .

وفي خلال تلك المدة لحظ الحاكم
التركي في المدينة « حركة غير عادية في
الجزيرة العربية » فارسل كتابين احدهما
لباب العالي والثاني الى جمال باشا يخبره
فيها بتلك الحركة غير العادية التي يشعر
بها في الجزيرة العربية . واتصل بالشريف
حسين نبأ ذينك الكتابين فكظم غيظه
واسرع في الحال الى ملاشاة الشك الذي
اثاره حاكم المدينة التركي في نفوس رجال
الحكومة العثمانية وارسل ولده الامير
فيصل بصحبة خمسين شاباً من ابناء
رؤساء العشائر الحجازية المختلفة الى
دمشق لقيموا لدى جمال باشا باعتبار
انهم طليعة الفرق المتطوعة . فقابلهم ذلك
اقائد بقاية من الابتهاج لانه رأى ان
هذه الكتلة النبيلة من ابناء العشائر العربية
هي خير « رهينة » لخضوع عرب
الحجاز للخليفة العثماني .

ولما استقر المقام بالامير فيصل في
دمشق عاد للاتصال بالالبكري ومكث
في دمشق خمسة اشهر طوال لعب فيها
دوره بمهارة حيث كان يجتمع برجال
الحركة العربية بين حين وآخر في بيت
آل البكري الذي كان وقتئذ المقر الرئيسي
السري للحركة الثورية العربية .

وتقدمت المفاوضات في خلال هذه

الفترة بين شريف مكة والانكليز ،
وكان جمال باشا يعتقد ان الحسين لا يجرؤ
على العصيان مادامت تلك « رهينة »

مقيمة في دمشق بمتناول يده . .
الاتراك اخبرهم بانه اتفق مع جمال باشا
على الانتظار في المدينة حتى ترده اشارة
منه تنبئه بالطريق التي يجب ان يقدم فيها
مع قوات المتطوعة الى دمشق

وهكذا نجا الامير فيصل من (فخ)
جمال باشا ولكنه كان شديد القلق على
مصير الحسين شاباً الذي يحفظهم ذلك
الطاعة التركي في دمشق . وقد اصطلح
مع نسيب بك البكري قبل عودة الوفد
من المدينة على نص مرموز لبرقيتين
مرموزتين احدهما ترمز الى اعلان الثورة
وضرورة حرب الثوار من دمشق والاخرى
ترمز الى تأجيل ذلك

ولم يكذب ذلك الوفد يصل عائد الى
دمشق حتى وصلت نسيب بك برقية من
فيصل هذا نصها :

دمشق - نسيب بك البكري
« ارسلوا الفرسان الصفراء »

وكانت هذه البرقية اشعاراً من
فيصل يده الثورة كما هو مصطلح عليه
بينها

ولحسن حظ آل البكري والحسين
شاباً من ابناء العشائر العربية الموجودين
في دمشق ، بل لحسن حظ الثورة العربية
ذاتها ان جمال باشا لم يكن حين ورود
تلك البرقية في دمشق بل كان في القدس
وهب آل البكري في الحال فارسلوا
عياهم بطريق السكة الحديدية الحجازية
يصحبهم فوزي بك شقيق نسيب بك
وزيت الرجال اربعة ايام في دمشق .
ولحسن حظهم لم يدر جمال باشا بسفر
الحريم الفجائي ، الى ان وثقوا من وصول
عياهم الى المدينة ، وفي اليوم الخامس

→ "Al-Shargh"
Jamaat had left
Damascus for J'ham
on 15.V.16 and
return to Damascus
on 28.V.16
Faisel left Damascus
by train for Medina
on 16.V.16.

امتطوا جيادهم الاصيل وتوغلوا في الصحراء
وعاد جمال باشا في ذلك اليوم الى
دمشق، وهناك فقط اخذ ملأ بما جرى
ولما بمض بعد على سفر نسيب وصحبه
بضع ساعات.. فارغى وازيد واستدعى
اليه قائد شرطة دمشق فعاقيه عقاباً صارماً
وارسل فريقاً من السواري التركي
لمطاردة الهاربين ولكنهم لم يعثروا لهم
في فيافي الصحراء على اثر.. وكانت
الهابزون استقروا في مضارب الامير
نايف الشعلان احد رجال الحركة الثورية
العربية

وفي ذلك اليوم ايضاً اطلق الحسين
بن علي في مكة الطلقة الاولى ايندانا
بالثورة فوجهت فرق متطوعة العرب
بنادقها الى جهة القوات التركية واندلم
لهيب الثورة العربية التي تكلم الكثير عنها
في كتبهم واحاديثهم والتي اسفرت عن
تغيير كبير في خارطة الجزيرة العربية
وفي تلك الاثناء الصعبة التي تعد
من اخرج ايام الثورة العربية نشب خلاف
بين الحاكم التركي في مكة وبين الامير
علي بن الحسين ادى الى توتر العلاقات
بينهما. واتصل خبر ذلك الخلاف بجمال
باشا فاعز الى الامير فيصل ان يكتب
الى الامير فيصل ان يكتب الى ابيه
يطلب منه ارسال الامير علي الى دمشق
ولكن الامر انتهى بنفي الامير علي الى
المدينة

وعلى اثر ذلك ازداد جمال باشا
حنقاً على رجال العرب واخذ يعلقهم
بالعشرات على اعواد المشاقق. وكان بين
الذين اعدمهم ذلك الطاغية اربعة من
رجال (الحزب العربي الثوري) الذين
يعرفون جميع تفاصيل الحركة الثورية.
وقد جرب الامير فيصل التوسط لدى
جمال باشا بالعفو عنهم ولكن ذلك
القائد التركي فضلاً عن انه رده خائباً بمثل

مصيرهم ان هو حاول ان يبير شكوكه
نحوه مرة اخرى... ولو ان واحداً من
اولئك الاربعة افضى بما يعلمه عن الخطط
الثورية لكان لتلك الحركة الوطنية العربية
شأن آخر غير الذي نراه اليوم.

وفي صباح ذات يوم عرف الامير
فيصل بتمام المفاوضات بين والده وبين
الانكليز، وعلم باستكمال الاستعداد لاداء
الثورة العربية، وان جيوش العرب
المتطوعة اصبحت ترابط في ضواحي
مكة بقيادة الامير علي، فشرع في رسم
خطة ينجو بها من دمشق مع بقية
«الرهينة» وكانت تلك الفترة من
اخرج ساعات حياته...

ولما ان درى جمال بقيام الامير علي
على رأس فرق المتطوعة العرب ووجهته
دمشق تلاشت من نفسه الشكوك التي
حامت حول اخلاص شريف مكة واخذ
من تلك الساعة يعامل فيصل وجماعته
معاملة ودية. واغتنم فيصل هذه الفرصة
فعرض على جمال باشا ارسال وفد خاص
لاستقبال الامير علي وجيشه المتطوع.
فارتاح جمال لهذه الفكرة ووافق على
مخروج الامير فيصل نفسه على رأس ذلك
الوفد. وهكذا خرج الامير فيصل من
دمشق وبصحبه ثلث من الضباط منهم
نسيب بك البكري وعبد القادر الخطيب
لملاقاة الامير علي. فوصلوا الى المدينة
ومكثوا فيها يومين وكان المفروض ان يعود
ذلك الوفد الى دمشق بعد ان قضى المهمة
التي قدم لاجلها.. ولكن الامير فيصل
ابى العودة اليها بحجة انه شديد الشوق
الى اخيه...

ولكي يزيل ما علق من الشك في
نفوس بقية رجال الوفد من الضباط



Friday
8th. Sha'ban 1334
9th. June 1916

Jamia al-Islamia
12th December, 1932

EXTRACT FROM CHAPTERS BY HOGARTH.

Sherif Feisal had passed through Syria early in the year and talked with, and been made much of, by Jemal; but he had talked also with certain Young Arabs - He was forwarded to Constantinople and was there during our early failures in the Dardanelles and the Gallipoli peninsula. He sent word to his father in Mecca that our star was not in the ascendant, and it was plainly no moment to demand independence for Hejaz. Returning through Syria in the spring, he visited Jemal again at Jerusalem and swore to stand by the Caliph and the Faith. Other language could hardly have been held at the headquarters of the Fourth Army, but his was not only lip service. A letter written by him about this moment from Syria to his father, and who with wise candour showed it to us at a later period, proves that genuine concern for the fate of Islam in general, should her champions for the past six centuries be weakened, now was disputing (?) his mind with desire for Arab independence. Rather would he serve the Turk, if the old time Osmanli of the days before a Committee of Union and Progress had put Islam to shame could return to power, than be freed by infidel help, British or other.

Events, however, were happening even then which went far to decide both him and his father, as later they would decide Jaafar

Pasha, lieutenant of the Senussi, soon to be successively in arms against us, our prisoner in Cairo, our sincere, courageous and capable ally. These events were the executions of Syrian patriots and especially of some who had escaped to Nuri Shaalan's headquarters at Jaaf and been forwarded thence by his son under safe-conduct towards Hejaz. Captured or betrayed by stipendiary Bedu of the Turks, they were brought to the railway and there hanged. They are said to have died well, and a last exhortation ascribed to one of them reported a saint, gained wide currency in the Arab world.

.....

.....

Where these martyrs had failed, certain representatives of the Syrian secret societies had succeeded, and in the late spring of 1915 it was proposed explicitly to Emir Hussein that he should take the initiative in revolt as having best chance of quick success in his remote situation, and that he should be leader of the Arabs in a struggle for national existence. Incensed by Jemal's acts, galled by the closing of the Red Sea ports and the reduction of the Pilgrimage to purely domestic affair, and inspired by real belief in our star and regard for our nation, he did not wait longer (we had made no progress in Gallipoli and had made none in France), but wrote and despatched in July a secret letter, to Mr.

Ronald Storrs, Oriental Secretary at the Residency, conveying a proposal on certain conditions, to raise the standard of revolt in the name of the Arabs.

Monday, January 20. Conversation with Emir Faisal, Colonel Lawrence interpreting. [This conversation took place at Diarbakir, see particulars in the main text of the Diary.]

..... The desire for independence found its expression in the secret societies, el Ahad, which was confined to Arab officers in the Turkish army, and the Fettah, a society which any Arab could join. They were bound by oaths to give their lives for Arab freedom from Turkish rule.

The society Fettah has never been mentioned before tonight outside of Arab circles. Lawrence did not know much about it as he had to ask Faisal later what its name was after it had once been mentioned. We were asked by Lawrence not to mention it outside because there were still Arab deportees in Asia Minor who might suffer.

These societies were gaining members, especially Fettah, by thousands in Mesopotamia, in Syria and even in Hejaz. Faisal belonged. I think he said also his family. Before their organization was completed the war came. This seemed the time for the Arab revolt.....

Emir Faisal had been in Constantinople from the age of 5 to 23.....

Djemal's executions. Hussein sent word to the Turkish Government that they must stop. When they were continued, Hussein was won over by a deputation from the secret societies, who came to him and said: "You are of our blood and of an old and honoured family. It is your duty to lead us....."

AB. No 42, Feb. 15, 1917

Faisal's Table Talk

... In Jan. 1915, Yasin, Ali Riza, Abdul Ghani and others approached the Sherif of Mecca and suggested a military rebellion in Syria. The Sherif sent Faisal up to report. He found Divisions 25, 35 and 36 ready to revolt, but public opinion less ready, and a general opinion in military circles that Germany would win the war quite rapidly. He went to Constantinople and waited till the Dardanelles was in full blast. He then came back to Damascus, judging it a possible moment; but he found the well-disposed Divisions broken up, and his supporters scattered. So he suggested to his father that they delay till England had been properly approached, and Turkey had suffered crippling losses, or until an Allied landing had been effected at Alexandria....

TEL.

(from a report to Lt. Col. Wilson
on Jan. 8, 1917)

HS.

INFORMATION

FROM TWO ARAB OFFICERS

RECENTLY ARRIVED IN ENGLAND

FROM KERMANSAAH IN THE CAUCASUS

AND EXAMINED BY SIR M. SYKES.

WAR OFFICE

25th September 1916

Lieutenant SHUKRI SHURBAJI

On the outbreak of war I was at the Military College in Damascus and was called up as a Cadet. In February 1915, I was made 2nd Lieut. and afterwards promoted to Lieut. I remained about a year in Damascus as Instructor first, and then was made A.D.C. to Place Commandant and Military Police Officer. On the opening of hostilities the Turkish authorities ordered that great demonstrations should be held. The majority of the population however did not want war, it was still feeling the disastrous effects from the Tripoli and Balkan wars. The authorities tried to raise the spirits of the people by the promise of swift victories and the conquest of Egypt.... The Arab Committee, to which I belong, increased its activities, protesting the downfall of Turkey, and the emancipation of the Arabs from Turkish misrule, with the assistance of England and France.... At that time Kemal Pasha showed great consideration to the Arabs, and never betrayed his antagonism. He sought the friendship of Arab notables, and extended hospitality to them. Kemal's outward benevolence towards the Arabs lasted until the failure of the Dardanelles expedition, then he unmasked, and began

began his rule of terror with wholesale hangings and deportations.

About the middle of June 1915 I received the order to go to C'ple with 19 other young Arab Officers, all like myself belonging to the Arab Committee. The Turkish authorities began to get alarmed at the spreading of the Arab movement, and tried to undermine it by dispersing the Arab Officers.....

A week after my arrival in C'ple, I was attached to the Place Commandant as a Military Police Officer in the 4th Battalion.

On August 15, the Battalion was ordered to join the 75th Regiment, 25th Division, at SAROS.... After a month's stay at SAROS, our Battalion was annexed to the 1st Regiment, 2nd Division, and ordered to proceed to Mesopotamia.

AHMED YOUSSEF SHAYKHA

At the time Turkey entered the war I was at Damascus, a Sergeant in the 1st. Brigade, 1st. Battalion, 74th. Regiment, 25th. Division, all Arabs. ... A fortnight after the outbreak of hostilities I was promoted to 2nd. Lieut. and ordered to Dara'a where I was incorporated in the 75th. Regiment of the same Division. I remained at Dara'a till the 26th. October when my Regiment received orders to proceed to Palestine in order to join the expedition against Egypt. ... We left Dara'a on October 26th, 1914, and went by train in 12 hours to ZILZIL, where we stayed 6 days. From the latter place we marched in 6 hours to Beblus. ... We arrived at Beblus on the 11th. December 1914. ... After the return of the expedition from the Canal, the 25th. Division was ordered to Gaza. ... I was assigned to the 2nd. Batt., 75th. Regt., 25th. Div. I was two months at Gaza. Owing to the failure of the expedition to Egypt and ill-treatment, the troops began to show signs of discontent and demoralisation. Disturbances were a daily occurrence, 20 to 30 every day. The daily bombardments of our camps by British warships contributed to add to the despondency of the troops. Men were killed and wounded by shell fire every

every day, as an instance, the 73d. Regt. lost 25
wounded and 8 killed in one day. English aviators
flew frequently over our camps and threw leaflets
printed in Arabic stating that England was very
friendly to the Arabs and was eager to deliver them
from the oppression of the Turks. The proclamations
urged the Arab officers and soldiers to desert, and
that a very cordial welcome would be extended to
them on board British warships, and would be
well treated. The Turkish Command sent men
to ~~pick~~ collect all leaflets and gave strict orders
that the soldiers should not pick them up or read
them; many, however, got them and hid them. The
impression made on the troops by these proclamations
was very great. Since then, some men who had
been sent to the Canal to throw torpedoes gave
themselves up to the English. At Gaza, Ismail Pasha
took severe measures, soldiers were not allowed to
approach the sea-shore. The Government, fearing
a rebellion amongst the troops, and on account of
unfavourable reports, decided to send the 25th Divⁿ to
Gallipoli. This decision, however, was kept secret
and the troops were told that orders had come
from C^ople to send them to Mount Lebanon.
We left Gaza about the end of May, and proceeded
in 2 days to Uzun Kara, a Turkish Colony near Jaffa.

We stayed 18 days and went to Aleppo, where we
entrained for Damascus. It took us three days to
reach Damascus, the wheels of the train slipping and
backing on account of the myriads of locusts that
covered the tracks. ~~We witnessed~~ At Damascus
we were only allowed the time to change trains, and
got on to the Damascus - Beirut Railway. We
witnessed scenes of great commotion and despair
at the station. Thousands of men, women and
children crowded the station and clamoured to
see their sons and relatives, but were not allowed
to get near the train, and were brutally pushed
back by the soldiers and gendarmes. The train
started amidst the cries of agony and imprecations
of women and children..... The soldiers who
thought they were going to Lebanon were informed
that the Battalion was ordered to Aleppo. Very
strict measures were taken at every station against
restriction. Soldiers were not allowed to leave the
train. I was refused leave to go to Beirut and see
my relatives, and, having refused, I was
punished with 24 hours prison in the train.....

We arrived at San Stefano on Bairam day.

Military Movements

The following military movements are matters of certainty, according to the two officers (Shurbaji and Shaykha), and may be used as tests & sources of information.

On mobilisation in August.

Regts.	Div ⁿ .	Place	Date
73, 74	25	Damascus	Aug. 15 th , 1914
75	25	Dara'a	" "
67, 68, 69	23	Hama & neighbourhood	" "
XXX	27	Jerusalem	" "

73, 74, 75	25	Vicinity of Canal	Feb. 3, 1915
68	23	Vicinity of Canal	" "
67, 69	23	Jerusalem	" "
28, 29, 30	10	Vicinity of Canal	" "
XXX	8	Jerusalem	" "

N.B. 10th under Trauner (German) from C'ple

8th under Schwabe (German) from Rodosto

XXX	8	Left J'lem for Gallipoli	April 29, 1915
28, 29, 30	10	" "	May 14, 1915
73, 74, 75	25	" "	June 1, 1915
XXX	27	Remained in Syria	
67, 68, 69	23	Left J'lem for Tarsus - Bozanti	March 27, 1915
31, 32, 39	3	Arrived Damascus	Jan. 7, 1916

In Mesopotamia there are three Turkish Divisions, the 45th, 51st and 52nd. The 35th Divⁿ was dissolved in order to refill the gaps of the other 3 Divisions. The total numerical strength is about 20,000 men.

The two officers are certain that there was a 21st Divⁿ at Ari Burnu. Lieut. Shaykha says not the Independent Divⁿ from Asir as this could only move by sea.

No. 17, May 16, 1916, p. 5.

"The Amir Faisal bey, son of the Amir of Mecca, left Damascus this morning for Medina, accompanied by Shaikh Abdul Qader Eff. al-Khatib and Nasib Eff. al-Bakri, on a delegation from His Excellency Ahmad Jamal Pasha for the purpose of welcoming the detachments of volunteers sent by the Amir of Mecca who are destined to join forces with their companions the mujahideen of Medina who had preceded them to the field of Jihad and who displayed such valour in the battle of Qatia as we had stated in a former number. The delegates were seen off at the station with fitting pomp."

(Local News)

No. 18, May 17, 1916, p. 1.

Leading article reporting an interview with the Amir Faisal, in which the latter states ~~(to be copied)~~ that the force of Mujahideen expected from Mecca would be composed of cavalry & camelry from the tribes of Harb 'Utaiha, Sulaim, Thaghit & others, & that they had to be led by one of the Ashraf. The force was expected at Medina 6 days hence, & after a stay of a few days there would come to Damascus & proceed to the Canal front.

Copy filed in
Proposed Operations in Syria H.S.

An A. D. C. to Fakhri Pasha who was sent away in disgrace from Aleppo to Gallipoli to be killed, but who deserted to the English near Arafarta has given a considerable amount of information about the work of the Pan-Arab party in Syria.

It is beginning, like all Oriental revolutions, in the Army, amongst the junior officers (there are practically no Arab Generals -- as Jifar Tayar lately said in Constantinople "We cannot run the risk of them" --). These officers have formed a committee among the Staffs, and have oaths and a programme. The Mosul and Baghdad Divisions are the most affected; but the Syria, Hejaz and Yemen Corps are all being cultivated.

The ordinary members promise to come along and help, with their men, when the Committee give the signal. Civilians are admitted to membership but have little voice in affairs. The first scheme was to assist the expected British landing at Alexandretta. Amin Lutfi bey was charged by Fakhri and Jemal with the duty of fortifying the Bay, and he arranged his trenches and batteries where they could be ^{of} ~~at~~ no possible use to anyone. The Mosul and Homs Divisions, who lay behind the Amanus in reserve, had arranged, as soon as we were in position, to come over and help us.....

The Sherif is party to these schemes. This plan was disturbed by the British failure to land. This was unfortunate, for the Staff arranged a mutiny in Homs in February, and had all

telegraph wires cut, and the Kurdish cavalry suborned in readiness; the mutiny took place, and on account of it the Mosul Corps was sent away from Syria.

Informant was also successful in inflaming a mutiny in Mosul, which he was sent to quell by Fakhri Pasha. This was the real cause of the break-up of the 36th Division. The junior staff in Aleppo are working hard to persuade all their men to desert..... Nuri Shaalan and Hachim (of the Aneyza) are prominent members. Ibn Saud, Idrisi and Yahia have promised help, though with the reservation that their independent status will not be affected in any way under the new Government. They have support among the Billi, and are very strong in Damascus, Mosul and Baghdad....

3.IX.15.

Intelligence Department.

War Office.

Cairo

16 November, 1914.

The Committee of the Arab Union (El Jamia el Arabiya) has already spread among the Arab officers of the Turkish Army the spirit of revolt against their Turkish and German officers.

It is firmly believed in Syria that when the order for the advance on Egypt is given, the Arab officers will rise in revolt, and kill their Turkish and German officers and take the government of the country into their hands.

But Sheikh Rashid Rida thinks that the rising will be more general and have a firm basis, if the Arab officers were given to understand that the English will give them timely help both morally and materially.

Sheikh Rashid Rida wishes therefore to be authorised to convey to the Arab officers as soon as possible the fact that they can depend on the help of the English, and explain to them how they can get this help in due time.

The proclamations which are being spread by the Druse Shekib Arslan and his friends that the English are the enemies of Islam are doing much harm, and it is very necessary to assure the Moslems of Syria -- through the Committee of the Arab Union in Syria-- not only that the English are not the enemies of Islam, but that they are prepared to help them to gain their independence.
